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COMMENTS

EXXON SHIPPING CO. V. BAKER: THE PERILS OF JUDICIAL
PUNITIVE DAMAGES REFORM
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
established a conservative one-to-one cap on the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages in maritime law. This decision raises the question
whether the Court will apply a similar constitutional limit in future punitive
damages cases. In the meantime, lower courts have already begun to rely on
Exxon Shipping as persuasive authority for limiting punitive damages further
than the Supreme Court’s previous cases require. This Comment argues that
Exxon Shipping’s one-to-one cap in maritime cases is inconsistent with key
principles of punitive damages law, advises against the application of Exxon
Shipping’s one-to-one cap in non-maritime cases, and explains why the
Supreme Court should not enact a similar cap on punitive damages in future
constitutional cases.
Punitive damages are too important to be capped at a one-to-one ratio with
compensatory damages. This Comment explains that such a cap has the
potential to create significant economic inefficiencies. Moreover, a one-to-one
cap undermines the retributive role of punitive damages since reprehensible
conduct often may not result in substantial compensatory damages. The rule
of Exxon Shipping will likely remain the law in admiralty, but, as this
Comment argues, courts should not to expand the rule of Exxon Shipping
beyond maritime cases.
INTRODUCTION
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court held that punitive
damages for reckless conduct should be limited to a one-to-one ratio with
compensatory damages as a matter of maritime common law.1 Exxon Shipping
represents a departure from the Court’s prior punitive damages cases such as
1

128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008).
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell2 and BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore,3 where the Court evaluated punitive damages awards
under the Due Process Clause.4 In some respects, Exxon Shipping is an
extension of these earlier cases because while the Court ostensibly based its
holding on maritime law, it did not rely on maritime law precedent.5 Rather,
the Court based its decision upon fairness considerations, policy analysis, and
statistical studies of punitive damages. This Comment argues that the Court’s
reasoning fails to justify its strict limitation of maritime punitive damages.
Building upon and revising some of the conclusions of earlier scholarship, this
Comment demonstrates that punitive damages often need to exceed a one-toone ratio with compensatory damages to deter future harms and provide
retributive justice.6 Finally, just as the Court criticizes “outlier” punitive
damages awards,7 this Comment argues that Exxon Shipping itself should be
viewed as an “outlier” case and should not be treated as persuasive authority
for placing further limits on non-maritime punitive damages.
This Comment focuses on the potentially far-reaching implications of
Exxon Shipping’s one-to-one cap on punitive damages for reckless conduct.
Although punitive damages are a controversial feature of American law,8 this
Comment shows that punitive damages are too important to be rendered
ineffectual by overly stringent caps. By increasing liability to an amount in
excess of what is required to compensate the plaintiff, a punitive award goes
beyond the traditional goal of making the plaintiff whole.9 Important
deterrence and retributive rationales justify this extra-compensatory penalty.10

2

538 U.S. 408 (2003).
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
4 Id. at 562 (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a
‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.” (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 454 (1993))).
5 See Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2619–34.
6 See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910 (2008) (“Deterrence is the function of tort law by which the law
creates incentives that induce people to avoid inappropriately dangerous activities.”).
7 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2633 (“[T]he unpredictable outlier cases . . . call the fairness of the
system into question.”).
8 Alex Sienkiewicz, Towards a Legal Land Ethic: Punitive Damages, Natural Value, and the Ecological
Commons, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 99 (2006).
9 See Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1989).
10 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (“Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, the
consensus today is that punitives are aimed . . . at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Marc Galanter
& David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1428 (1993).
3
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Although these rationales occasionally conflict,11 this Comment argues that
they frequently overlap—especially when the defendant’s conduct is reckless.
This analysis reveals that the Court’s adoption of a one-to-one cap in cases of
reckless conduct lacks support. To be useful, punitive damages often must be
awarded at a higher ratio.12
Part I of this Comment examines facts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill that
were glossed over in the mainstream media and demonstrates why, from a
retributivist perspective, the Exxon corporation may have deserved
punishment. Part II demonstrates that punitive damages are a vital part of the
common law, many states have already limited punitive damages, and the
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence on punitive damages adequately
protects defendants from egregious punitive awards. The heart of this
Comment, Part III, presents an economic analysis of various situations in
which punitive damages should be awarded at a greater than one-to-one ratio,
explains the retributivist approach to punitive damages, and illustrates how the
two can be reconciled. Part IV critiques the Court’s reasoning in Exxon
Shipping, emphasizing its failure to take account of the role of punitive
damages in providing deterrence and retribution. Finally, Part V argues that
Exxon Shipping should not be viewed as persuasive authority for limiting
punitive damages in non-maritime cases.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Although the Valdez oil spill was one of the most publicized anthropogenic
environmental disasters in history,13 many of the facts surrounding the incident
were deliberately obscured by Exxon’s public relations experts and are not
well-known.14 These facts reveal that the spill was the result of Exxon’s
foolish decision to allow a captain who was a “relapsed alcoholic” to pilot the

11 Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 577 (2005) (“[T]he goals of deterrence . . . may well conflict with those of
retribution . . . .”).
12 Galanter & Luban, supra note 10, at 1396 (“[I]f punitive damages are pared back too drastically, civil
law may be underenforced.”).
13 JAMES W. DEARING & EVERETT M. ROGERS, AGENDA-SETTING 39 (1996) (noting the “massive media
attention given to the Exxon Valdez incident”); Hannah Lendon & Brian Martin, Environmental Disasters, in
BRIAN MARTIN ET AL., JUSTICE IGNITED 99, 103 (2006) (“Of all spills, the Exxon Valdez is most wellknown.”).
14 See RIKI OTT, NOT ONE DROP: BETRAYAL AND COURAGE IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL
SPILL 19, 66–67 (2008) (“Exxon launched an aggressive public relations campaign to quiet ‘rumors’ of
extensive damage from its spill.”).
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Valdez.15 In addition to the circumstances of the spill itself, Exxon’s promises
before the spill and its behavior after the spill underscore the justification for
retributivist damages.16
In January 1968, America’s largest oil field17 was discovered 250 miles
north of the Arctic Circle in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.18 Because the surrounding
ocean is frozen much of the year at this latitude, several oil companies
proposed to build the 800-mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) to
transport oil from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez, Alaska, where it would be pumped
into tankers for marine transport.19 It was clear at an early stage that the
environmental risks of the project included the possibility of massive oil spills
that could jeopardize the ecology and economy of Prince William Sound and
disrupt the subsistence lifestyles of Alaskans and Native Americans living in
the area.20
To alleviate fears of an environmental catastrophe, the oil companies
involved, including Exxon, promised both the public and Congress (whose
approval was required)21 that they would adhere to high standards of care to
curtail or even eliminate the risk of major oil spills.22 These promises
convinced Congress, and in the summer of 1977, the first tanker carrying oil
from Prudhoe Bay cast off from the Port of Valdez into the waters of Prince
William Sound.23

15 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The jury could reasonably
have believed that Exxon knowingly allowed a relapsed alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled with
millions of gallons of oil through waters that provided the livelihood for the many plaintiffs in this case.”); see
also id. at 2612 (majority opinion) (detailing Captain Hazelwood’s consumption of alcohol).
16 CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS 374–75 (1999) (describing the contingency plans that oil
companies were required to submit before being allowed to operate in Prince William Sound as “fantasy
documents”).
17 OTT, supra note 14, at 273.
18 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALASKAN NORTH SLOPE OIL: LIMITING EFFECTS OF LIFTING EXPORT
BAN ON OIL AND SHIPPING INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS 12 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1999/rc99191.pdf.
19 Id.
20 Brief of the Alaska Legislative Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/
preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-219_RespondentAmCuAlaskaLegCouncil.pdf.
21 OTT, supra note 14, at 24.
22 Brief of the Alaska Legislative Council et al., supra note 20, at 10; OTT, supra note 14, at 273 (“[In
1972] oilmen and/or [the] Nixon administration repeatedly promised that state-of-the-art construction, tankers,
navigational procedures, and oil spill response equipment will make ‘operations in Port Valdez and Prince
William Sound the safest in the world.’”).
23 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 18, at 12.
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Within two years, the oil companies were beginning to disregard their
earlier promises to Congress, including the pledge to use double-bottomed
tankers, which would have limited the impact of a spill by as much as fifty
percent.24 The companies also fell behind in contingency planning and
preparedness. After the Valdez spill, an investigative team found that Exxon’s
“emergency plan” contained no contingency planning specifically tailored to
conditions at Prince William Sound.25 Apparently, Exxon’s only on-shore
response equipment consisted of a van and some sampling gear.26 This lack of
preparedness ensured that effective cleanup would be nearly impossible in the
event of a spill.27
The Valdez spill occurred several minutes after midnight on March 24,
1989, when the Valdez struck a reef in Prince William Sound, tearing open
eleven of the ship’s cargo tanks with gashes that extended along its full
length.28 Shortly afterwards, Coast Guard investigators discovered that the
ship’s captain, a known alcoholic, had taken command that night after
consuming five double vodkas.29 Within several weeks of the spill, oil had
spread to cover one thousand square miles of pristine ocean.30
Prince William Sound is a highly sensitive marine environment,31 and it is
especially vulnerable to the long-term effects of an oil spill because cold water
temperatures in the Sound result in slower-than-usual weathering and
biodegradation of oil.32 The spilled oil killed marine birds, mammals,33 and
fish.34 In addition, the spill affected the livelihoods of roughly one-third of
Alaska’s twelve thousand commercial fishermen,35 and fishery closings caused
24 OTT, supra note 14, at 2; see also U.S. COAST GUARD, OIL SPILL RESPONSE RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: A DECADE OF ACHIEVEMENT 37 (2003).
25 SAMUEL K. SKINNER & WILLIAM K. REILLY, NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL:
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 8 (1989) [hereinafter NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM REPORT], available at
www.uscg.mil/History/.../ExxonValdezNRT1989Report.pdf.
26 Id.
27 Lendon & Martin, supra note 13, at 103. However, even if Alyeska Pipeline Service Company,
Exxon, and the Coast Guard had been more prepared, an effective cleanup would have been unlikely. See
Eliot Marshall, Valdez: The Predicted Oil Spill, SCIENCE, April 1989, at 20.
28 NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
29 In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). Exxon officials were aware of the captain’s
alcohol problems. ROBERT M. SCHOCH, CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 44 (1996).
30 NAT’L RESPONSE TEAM REPORT, supra note 25, at 13.
31 Id. at 26–27, 31.
32 Id. at 25.
33 Id. at 27.
34 Id. at 28.
35 Id. at 31.
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by the spill affected an estimated three to four thousand workers in the area’s
fish processing industry.36 The spill resulted in serious financial losses and
psychological stresses for the inhabitants of the area, as well as severe and
long-term damage to the environment.37
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW: TRADITION AND REFORM
Turning from the facts of the spill, this Part describes the adequacy and
reasonableness of punitive damages law and its reforms prior to the Court’s
decision in Exxon Shipping. Section A reveals that punitive damages, far from
being a modern invention, have long been part of the common law38 and have
served important functions. Section B shows that state statutes frequently limit
punitive damages—proving that legislatures are capable of reforming punitive
damages without intervention by courts. Although some of these statutes have
harmful effects,39 they nonetheless provide valuable data on the costs and
benefits of tort reform.40 Finally, Section C argues that the punitive damages
cases where the Supreme Court relied on the Due Process Clause place
reasonable constitutional limits on punitive damages. Taken together, common
law principles, statutory limits, and constitutional interpretations show that
Exxon Shipping’s one-to-one rule is overly restrictive in any context—but
should certainly not be construed as applying beyond maritime law.
A. Common Law Punitive Damages
The first English case to provide an explicit articulation of punitive
damages was Wilkes v. Wood, decided in 1763.41 In Wilkes, the plaintiff
argued that “trifling damages would put no stop at all” to the defendant’s
conduct, and the court agreed.42 Wilkes thus recognized an important
economic justification for punitive damages: They are sometimes necessary to

36

Id.
Brief of Sociologists, Psychologists & Law & Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents passim, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219), available at http://
www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-219_RespondentAmCuSocPsychLawEcoScholars.pdf.
38 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 5 (5th ed. 2005).
39 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Children, Women, and the Elderly,
53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1307 (2004) (“[C]aps on punitive damages that tie them to the amount of economic loss
only can have a disparate impact on injured women.”).
40 Mark C. Weber, Mass Jury Trials in Mass Tort Cases: Some Preliminary Issues, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
463, 473 (1998).
41 SCHLUETER, supra note 38, at 5.
42 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (KB).
37
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deter the defendant from engaging in similar conduct in the future.43 A later
English case, Merest v. Harvey, exemplifies a second economic justification
for punitive damages.44 In Merest, the court remarked that it was appropriate
to award punitive damages in a case involving a defendant who had
provocatively knocked off the plaintiff’s hat,45 reasoning that awards in such
cases served to “prevent the practice of dueling.”46
Linda Schlueter, author of the treatise Punitive Damages, shows that by the
mid-eighteenth century, established legal doctrine held that punitive damages
could be used to punish the defendant in cases of “malice, oppression, or gross
fraud.”47 Unlike today,48 juries were given “unfettered discretion” to decide
the amount of damages.49 Schlueter notes that punitive damages were also
used to compensate for injuries that were not otherwise compensable in
English law at the time,50 such as “hurt feelings, wounded dignity, or insult.”51
Across the Atlantic, early American courts also recognized benefits of punitive
damages. As Justice Story remarked in Boston Manufacturing Co. v. Fiske,
courts commonly used punitive damages to penalize “offending parties,” even
in maritime cases.52 Concurrent with a trend toward allowing compensatory
damages for emotional suffering, American courts in the nineteenth century
began to limit the purposes of punitive damages to punishment and
deterrence.53 In 1851, the Supreme Court explained the extra-compensatory
role played by punitive damages in Day v. Woodworth: “It is a well established
principle of the common law that . . . a jury may inflict . . . exemplary,
punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity

43 Accord Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[Compensatory
damages] would be too slight to give the victim an incentive to sue . . . . [T]o limit the plaintiff to
compensatory damages would enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impunity provided he was
willing to pay . . . .”).
44 SCHLUETER, supra note 38, at 9.
45 Id. at 10.
46 Merest v. Harvey, (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (Heath, J.).
47 SCHLUETER, supra note 38, at 6.
48 David Fink, Note, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, The Remittitur Doctrine, and the Implications for
Tort Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 228 (1999) (“The remittitur doctrine exists in virtually every jurisdiction
nationwide . . . .”).
49 SCHLUETER, supra note 38, at 6. However, in certain cases a grand jury would review the jury’s
findings, and if the grand jury overturned these findings, members of the jury would be subject to severe
penalties. Id. at 6 n.31.
50 Id. at 8.
51 Id.
52 2 Mason 119, 121 (1820).
53 Id. at 16.
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of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.”54
Thus, the Supreme Court recognized the common law view of punitive
damages more than 150 years ago. This basic view remained settled until the
era of tort reform in the last decades of the twentieth century.55 In sum, the
history reveals that punitive damages were approved by the highest courts and
served vital functions such as discouraging illegal retaliation for provocative
behavior and deterring defendants from repeating tortious conduct.
B. Recent Trends in State Regulation of Punitive Damages Law
In response to a perceived explosion in punitive damages liability in the
late twentieth century, many states enacted statutes limiting punitive damages
in various ways.56 Such approaches include (1) limiting punitive damages to
the amount of compensatory damages (or to some multiple thereof), (2)
capping punitive damages at specific dollar amounts, (3) prohibiting more than
one award of punitive damages based on the same conduct, (4) requiring that a
fixed percentage of all punitive damages awards go to a state victims’ fund,
and (5) requiring that punitive damages be determined in a proceeding separate
from one used to determine compensatory damages.57 As Justice Ginsburg
noted in her dissenting opinion in BMW of North America, Inc., these statutes
demonstrate that legislatures are capable of limiting punitive damages without
help from courts.58 In addition, legislative reforms of punitive damages are
more flexible than common law reforms of the type provided in Exxon
Shipping because legislation can be repealed or modified without running afoul
of stare decisis.59
54

Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort
Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (2005) (“In the 1970s insurance companies, tobacco interests,
and large industry launched a political campaign . . . . Unlike previous reform efforts that sought to change
rules of law through case-by-case adjudication in the courts, the self-styled tort ‘reform’ movement pursued a
much grander vision: transforming the cultural understanding of civil litigation . . . by attacking the system
itself . . . . [A]dvocates seek to persuade the public through advertising and lobbying that the civil justice
system is corrupted . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
56 John A. Albers, Note, State of Confusion: Substantive and Procedural Due Process with Regard to
Punitive Damages After TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 159, 175 (1994)
(“[S]ince 1986 many states enacted statutes that either placed caps upon the recovery of punitive damages or
stiffened the burden of proof applicable to such awards.”).
57 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 615–19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J. & Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (providing comprehensive survey of state legislation affecting punitive damages).
58 Id. at 613–14 (“[T]he reexamination prominent in state courts and in legislative arenas . . . serves to
underscore why the Court’s enterprise is undue.” (footnote omitted)).
59 PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 521 (1969) (“Ordinary legislation, not
disguised as constitutional interpretation, is flexible and subject to ready change in response to public opinion
55
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C. Constitutional Limits on Punitive Damages Awards
In 1996, the Supreme Court struck down a state court award of punitive
damages in the landmark case of BMW of North America v. Gore.60 In 2003,
the Court struck down another state court award in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, this time clarifying which awards of
punitive damages violate due process rights.61 In this dramatic episode in the
history of punitive damages, the Court recognized a constitutional right under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from
excessive and arbitrary punitive awards.62 This limit applies irrespective of the
process provided (as with other rights recognized as substantive due process63
rights).64 These pivotal holdings are summarized in the following paragraphs.
Although the Supreme Court’s due process cases recognize the value of
punitive damages awards as both a deterrent and a form of retributive justice,65
the Court imposed “procedural and substantive constitutional limitations” on
such awards.66 According to the Court, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or
arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”67 Additionally, the Court held that
compensatory damages should be presumed to make the plaintiff whole, so
punitive damages should only be awarded in cases where the defendant’s
conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to warrant further penalties.68 Against
this presumption, the Court held that, of all the factors to be considered, the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct was the most relevant in evaluating
the reasonableness of an award of punitive damages.69

without the tug-of-war which rules of stare decisis generate. Nor need it overcome the obduracy of men with
life tenure who, like most men, are not given to confess error.”).
60 517 U.S. 559.
61 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
62 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416.
63 Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The other objection to
the due process route in a case such as the present one is that it depends on the idea of ‘substantive’ due
process. This is the idea that depriving a person of life, liberty, or property can violate the due process clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments even if there are no procedural irregularities . . . .”).
64 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582 (limiting punitive damages despite right to a jury trial and appeals); State
Farm, 538 U.S. at 416 (limiting punitive damages).
65 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 419.
69 BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
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The Court provided numerical guidelines to indicate when the amount of
punitive damages in a particular case may be constitutionally excessive. Few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages will
satisfy the requirements of constitutional due process.70 The single-digit ratio
may be exceeded in cases where the harm is difficult to detect (a view the
economic literature amply supports)71 or in which an “egregious act has
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”72 Although nine-toone is the presumptive ceiling of the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages, the Court signaled that awards should not cluster at this upper
bound.73 According to the Court, in many cases a four-to-one ratio “might be
close to the line of constitutional impropriety,”74 but when compensatory
damages are “substantial,”75 a one-to-one ratio may be the maximum
acceptable ratio.76 On the other hand, the Court emphasized that these
guidelines are not inflexible or absolute,77 and several appellate courts have
deployed creative arguments to support large punitive awards.78
Traditional punitive damages and their reform before the decision in Exxon
Shipping represent a useful and still-evolving body of law under which
punitive damages have been substantially limited. The patchwork of state
statutory limits and the Supreme Court’s overarching constitutional framework
provide multiple levels of control over potentially erratic awards. If extended
to non-maritime cases, Exxon Shipping’s one-to-one cap on punitive damages
for reckless conduct would override many state statutes and represent a major
shift away from the flexibility of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence governing punitive damages.

70

State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
E.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 874 (1998).
72 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
73 Id.
74 Id. (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991)).
75 Id. The Court has never defined the amount of compensatory damages that should be considered
“substantial,” however.
76 Id.
77 Id. (“Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
78 See, e.g., Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding a
punitive damages award); Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a
punitive damages award in excess of nine-to-one ratio).
71
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III. AGAINST ONE-TO-ONE CAPS
This Part analyzes punitive damages according to both deterrence and
retributivist rationales. Section A analyzes the economic and deterrence-based
reasons for awarding punitive damages. This argument is limited to the
context of unintentional torts because focusing on negligence, recklessness,
and strict liability shows why the Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping is flawed
from an economic perspective. Section B presents non-economic and
retributivist arguments for punitive damages. Finally, Section C shows how
economic and retributivist rationales frequently overlap and suggests solutions
for those cases in which the rationales seem to point in different directions.
A. Economic & Deterrence-Based Arguments
Although foreseeable and preventable,79 the Exxon Valdez disaster was an
accident and not an intentional tort. Although scholars have written
extensively about the justifications for punitive damages in the context of
intentional torts,80 this analysis will focus exclusively on the reasons for
applying punitive damages in unintentional tort cases. The first subsection
introduces four basic economic concepts: (1) the burden of taking precautions,
(2) the probability of harm, (3) the gravity of harm, and (4) the concept of
efficient precautions. The second subsection applies these concepts by
investigating the incentives faced by a hypothetical firm, “ChemShip,” that
transports chemicals across the country with a fleet of eighteen-wheeled trucks.
This example, explored in detail, makes it possible to examine what happens
when certain variables change, such as the amount of care taken by the
company and the probability of paying damages, while other variables remain
constant. The ChemShip hypothetical demonstrates the need for punitive
damages in various recurring situations. For instance, under a strict liability
regime, punitive damages are warranted when ChemShip will sometimes be
able to escape paying damages even though its conduct is tortious.81 The third
subsection uses the ChemShip scenario to demonstrate that in a negligence
regime the possibility of escaping detection does not necessarily warrant an
award of punitive damages. Instead, courts should make the decision to award
79

See Marshall, supra note 27, at 20.
See, e.g., DAVID FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT
MATTERS 206–11 (2001) (discussing economic rationales for applying punitive damages in various intentional
tort scenarios); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 206–08 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing various
rationales for punitive damages).
81 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 874.
80

KERR GALLEYSFINAL

738

6/10/2010 2:12 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

punitive damages on a case-by-case basis.82 In both negligence and strict
liability regimes, a tortfeasor’s attempt to conceal harms or otherwise reduce
the probability of paying damages justifies an award of punitive damages. The
fourth subsection demonstrates that when a tortfeasor’s conduct is reckless, an
award of punitive damages may be warranted regardless of the probability of
paying damages.83 Finally, the fifth subsection critiques the argument that
punitive damages should not be awarded when the defendant is a corporation.
1. The Hand Formula & Efficient Precautions
As the common law has long recognized, punitive damages help to punish
wrongdoers, deter future harms, and avoid other social ills.84 Economic theory
reveals that punitive damages are particularly important if a tortfeasor has a
chance of escaping judgment or behaves recklessly.85 The law and economics
movement shows that harmful accidents can be avoided through changes in the
degree of caution with which activities are performed and through changes in
the overall volume of risky activities.86 Liability regimes, such as tort law,
force potential tortfeasors to take account of the accident costs they impose on
others.87 Ideally, those engaged in risky activities will take efficient
precautions by increasing care levels (and sometimes by decreasing activity

82 This is a departure from Judge Posner’s theory, which holds that punitive damages would be
inefficient in both negligence and strict liability cases. POSNER, supra note 80, at 206. Additionally my
argument that the analysis of punitive damages differs when the legal standard is negligence sets it apart from
Polinsky and Shavell’s study. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 886 (“Because damages should equal
harm under the strict liability rule, and because we assume that damages should equal harm under the
negligence rule for the reasons given, we generally will not distinguish between the rules in our subsequent
discussion.”).
83 This conclusion is in partial agreement with existing literature but is based on different reasoning. See
POSNER, supra note 80, at 207.
84 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989) (“[P]unitive
damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence . . . .”); see Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc.,
347 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[O]ne function of punitive-damages awards is to relieve the pressures
on an overloaded system of criminal justice by providing a civil alternative to criminal prosecution of minor
crimes. . . . [An] award of punitive damages . . . serves the additional purpose of limiting the defendant’s
ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection . . . .”).
85 See POSNER, supra note 80, at 206–07.
86 Shepherd, supra note 6, at 911.
87 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 314 (2008) (“Tort
law is commonly thought of as a mechanism of assigning liability to wrongdoers and thereby forcing them to
internalize the costs they impose on others. This, indeed, is its primary effect.”).
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levels) as long as the anticipated benefit from these additional precautions is
not outweighed by their cost.88
Judge Learned Hand’s negligence formula sums up this economic wisdom
with three simple variables: B for the burden of taking precautions, P for the
probability of harm, and L for the gravity of harm.89 The formula has proven
extremely useful in the economic analysis of law, and courts occasionally
apply it.90 It is important to note how the variables of the Hand Formula
interact with each other. Increasing B results in a decrease in P because an
accident is less likely to occur when precautions are taken.91 In addition, the
Hand Formula shows how the prospect of liability should encourage rational
actors to increase care levels to the optimal amount.92 When potential
tortfeasors take optimal precautions, they minimize costs to society—
calculated as the sum of the risk (P x L)—and the amount of resources devoted
to precautions (B), or (P x L) + B.93
2. Punitive Damages & Strict Liability
This Comment applies the concepts of burden, probability, and gravity of
harm in a simple example that will demonstrate why a tortfeasor’s liability
must sometimes exceed the amount of harm that the tortfeasor causes—in
other words, when a punitive award must be added to compensatory damages.
For this example, assume that a company, “ChemShip,” owns and operates a
fleet of eighteen-wheeled trucks that transport chemicals across the United
States. Assume that if ChemShip spends no money on precautionary measures
such as thicker tanks, safety valves, and driver rest requirements, then the
88 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1096 (2000) (“Traditional law and economics
suggests that precaution is efficient when its benefits outweigh its costs . . . .”).
89 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]n algebraic terms: if
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is less than] PL.”).
90 See POSNER, supra note 80, at 168 n.1.
91 Michelle J. White, The Economics of Accidents, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1988) (reviewing
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987)) (“Economists assume that accidents occur
less often and involve less damage when potential injurers and victims use higher levels of care.”).
92 Cf. Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97
(1993) (“Standard economic analysis has shown that in the unilateral risk context, strict liability rules can be
used to induce both efficient caretaking and efficient activity levels, because strict liability can be employed to
force injurers to bear the full social cost of any risks they create.”).
93 Id. at 1096 (describing the “level at which the total social cost of accidents is minimized—that is, the
level that minimizes the cost of reducing (or eliminating) the risk in question, plus the expected cost to the
members of society of the resulting injuries”).
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probability that a hazardous chemical spill will occur over the course of a year
is 0.05. If a spill occurs, the resulting harm will be $1 million. Also assume
that safety measures are available and not prohibitively expensive. According
to a model (which utilizes an equation to relate the money that ChemShip
might spend on precautions to the probability of a spill),94 an investment of
$10,000 will decrease the yearly probability of a spill to 0.0153, an investment
of $20,000 will reduce the probability to 0.0093, and an investment of $30,000
will reduce the probability to 0.0069. Note that the incremental reduction in
the probability of harm decreases with each additional $10,000 spent.95 This
occurs because reducing risk with additional safety measures becomes
progressively more expensive.96 Additionally, the equation presupposes that as
long as ChemShip is engaged in shipping activities, there will always be at
least a 0.001 probability of a spill in any given year, no matter how much is
spent on precautions.97 Although the numbers presented in this example are
hypothetical, they are representative of the situations that the tort doctrines
relating to accidents seek to control—situations involving risky activities
where precautions can be taken to reduce risk, but at an increasing marginal
cost.98 The following graph illustrates this scenario:

94 The model used here is not intended to reflect the real-world probability of accidents in the chemical
transportation industry, nor does it realistically depict the amount of money spent on precautionary measures.
The model does, however, accurately illustrate the relationship between the amount spent on safety
precautions and the probability of a harmful accident occurring.
95 The first $10,000 spent will decrease the probability by 0.0357. The second $10,000 spent will
decrease the probability by 0.0060. And the third $10,000 spent will decrease the probability by 0.0025.
96 POSNER, supra note 80, at 168 (“[I]nputs of care are scarce and therefore their price rises as more and
more are bought.”). Consequently, the amount of care per dollar decreases as more “care” is purchased.
97 This relationship is captured in a function that takes as its argument the dollar amount spent on
precautions and whose output is the probability of harm. The equation used for this example is f(x) = 200 / (x
+ 4000) + 0.001. It was designed to have a y-intercept of ~ 0.05, a slope that is initially negative but that
approaches 0, and a value for y that approaches 0.001 as x approaches infinity.
98 POSNER, supra note 80, at 168.
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Graph & Table 1: Total Costs (Private and Social) When Paying Damages Is
Certain99

Expected
Potential
Prob. of
Cost of
Liability/Harm
Liability/Harm
Harm
Precautions
(L)
(P)
(B)
(P x L)
$0.00
0.0510
$1,000,000.00
$51,000.00
*$10,000.00
0.0153
$1,000,000.00
$15,285.71
$20,000.00
0.0093
$1,000,000.00
$9,333.33
$30,000.00
0.0069
$1,000,000.00
$6,882.35
*Represents the socially optimal investment in precautions

Total Cost
B + (P x L)
$51,000.00
*$25,285.71
$29,333.33
$36,882.35

Assuming that L represents the actual harm caused by an accident and that
L will always be paid in the event of a spill, a liability scheme based on
charging the shipper $1 million each time an accident occurs will efficiently
manage risks. This scheme aligns private and social costs.100 Imposing
liability gives the shipper an incentive to invest roughly $10,000 in precautions
because doing so minimizes the shipper’s private costs. This level is also
socially optimal because it minimizes the sum of the precautionary costs
99

The single line in Graph 1 represents both private and social costs, which are equal in this case.
Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623,
628 (1992) (“The optimal deterrence framework holds that liability rules minimize social cost by forcing
defendants to choose levels of activity and care that reflect social costs and benefits rather than the defendants’
own private costs and benefits.”).
100
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expended by the shipper (which are themselves a cost to society) and the social
costs generated by the risk.
However, the well-functioning liability scheme described above goes awry
if the shipper is sometimes able to escape paying damages when accidents
occur.101 Perhaps spills are difficult to detect, or perhaps the harms from spills
only manifest long after an accident occurs.102 Assume that the probability that
the shipper will have to pay $1 million for a given accident is 0.25. The
following table shows how this causes private and social costs to diverge:

101

Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 887–89.
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Ex-Grace Officials on Trial in Asbestos Poisoning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009,
at A15 (“Charlie Welch, 55, who worked as a guard at the mine for a time and says he too suffers from
asbestosis . . . remembers the trains carrying vermiculite in open rail cars, billowing dust plumes through town
as they rumbled out to the wider world.”). The example of shipping asbestos-laden material in open rail cars
proves that tortious conduct may be both difficult to detect and slow to manifest. Id.
102
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Graph & Table 2: Private and Social Costs When the Probability of Paying
Damages Is 0.25.

† Indicates the level of precautionary spending that minimizes the shipper’s costs
* Represents the socially optimal investment in precautions

Here, ChemShip will choose to invest about $3,000 in precautions because
this minimizes the shipper’s private costs, but social costs would be
minimized, as before, if ChemShip were to spend roughly $10,000. Thus, the
reduced probability of detection changes the shipper’s cost schedule, causing a
substantial decrease in social welfare. When, as in the previous example, the
probability of paying damages is 1.0, social costs are $25,202.64, but with the
decreased probability of detection they are $32,242.07. Moreover, the
distributional effect is especially problematic since the shipper is much better
off in this scenario, with private costs of $10,310.52 rather than the $25,202.64
he would have to pay under the previous scenario. Perhaps the most troubling
implication of this comparison is that ChemShip will have a high incentive to
conceal accidents or engage in other conduct to escape liability. When the
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probability of detection drops from 1.0 to 0.25, ChemShip’s private costs drops
by nearly 60%. Accordingly, tortfeasors may attempt to capture the benefits of
reduced liability by attempting to conceal accidents or by pressuring victims
not to sue. This analysis suggests that because of the negative consequences
associated with reductions in the probability of paying damages, tortfeasors
who attempt to conceal accidents should be charged additional penalties.103
3. Punitive Damages & Negligent Torts
The Hand Formula shows that if an increase in B would result in a decrease
in P such that the benefit (in terms of a reduction in expected accident costs)
would exceed the cost of the precaution, then the injurer is negligent.104
Setting aside other factors (such as proximate cause and pure economic loss),
the negligent actor will pay L in compensation to the accident victim when B is
less than P x L.105 In contrast, if the injurer is not negligent, then the injurer is
not liable—no matter what harm results.
Since the negligence doctrine completely removes liability when an injurer
takes “due care,”106 the liability-diminishing effects of a reduction in the
probability of paying damages may not be large enough to induce a potential
tortfeasor to spend less than the optimal amount on precautions. In the present
example, where liability depends on a showing of negligence, even if the
probability of detection is as low as 0.25, the shipper will continue to spend the
socially optimal amount of $10,000, and punitive damages will be
unnecessary.107 The following graph reveals that the shipper still attains
minimal private costs (very narrowly) at the socially efficient level of
precautions:

103 See Paul H. Rubin, John E. Calfee & Mark F. Grady, BMW v Gore: Mitigating The Punitive
Economics of Punitive Damages, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 179, 189 (1997).
104 POSNER, supra note 80, at 168 (“Hand wrote that a potential injurer is negligent if but only if B <
PL . . .”). The “marginal Hand Formula” described by Judge Posner is similar to the formula used in these
examples. Id. at 168 n.2 (explaining how the “marginal Hand Formula” is derived).
105 See United States. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The formulation “If B <
PL then the actor is negligent” is in fact an oversimplification. See infra note for a discussion of a more
accurate method for assessing negligence based on the “marginal Hand Formula.”
106 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30, at 164, § 31, at 169 (W. Page Keeton
ed., 5th ed. 1984).
107 The model presented in this Part reveals that this may often be the case.
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Graph & Table 3: Private and Social Costs in Negligence When the Probability
of Paying Damages Is 0.25

Total Social Total Private
Expected
Cost
Cost
Damages
B + (P x L)
B + (P x L) x
Payment
0.25 If negligent
(P x L) x 0.25
If negligent108
$0.00
0.0510 $1,000,000.00 $51,000.00 $12,750.00
$51,000.00
$12,750.00
$3,000.00 0.0296 $1,000,000.00 $29,571.43 $7,392.86
$32,571.43
$10,392.86
*$10,000.00 0.0153 $1,000,000.00 $15,285.71 $0.00
*$25,285.71 *$10,000.00
$20,000.00 0.0093 $1,000,000.00 $9,333.33 $0.00
$29,333.33
$20,000.00
$30,000.00 0.0069 $1,000,000.00 $6,882.35 $0.00
$36,882.35
$30,000.00
Cost of
Prob.
Precautions
of
(B)
Harm
(P)

Potential
Harm
(L)

Expected
Accident
Cost
(P x L)

* Represents the socially optimal investment in precautions

The “carrot” of zero liability in a negligence regime provides a sufficient
incentive for ChemShip to exercise due care. In this case, even the costdistorting effects of reductions in the probability of detection do not
necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes. True, when the probability of
detection is 0.25, only one in four of those injured by negligent tortfeasors will
be compensated, but punitive damages will not solve that problem. Instead,
108 The shipper is non-negligent and therefore has expected liability of zero dollars once approximately
$10,000 has been spent on precautions. This is so because according to the marginal conception of negligence
(which is more accurate than a non-marginal approach), the optimal level of precaution occurs at the point
where taking any further precautions would not pass a cost-benefit test. Spending an additional dollar on
precautions after approximately $10,000 has been spent saves less than a dollar in expected accident costs.
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policies should be directed toward increasing the probability of detection so
that all parties injured by negligence may be compensated. This may be
accomplished by providing additional punishment for tortfeasors who take
measures to decrease the probability of detection of their actions, in effect
reducing potential tortfeasors’ incentive to conceal harms.109 Such tortfeasors
would obviously include those who attempt to conceal harms, but should also
include tortfeasors who conduct their operations in such a way that tracing
harms is difficult.
However, reducing the probability of paying damages from 0.25 to 0.1
dramatically alters the shipper’s incentives and demonstrates that a negligence
regime will not always cause the shipper to take due care. When the
probability of detection drops to 0.1, the model predicts that the shipper will
take few or no precautions.

109 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The most
straightforward rationale for punitive damages, as for fines and other criminal punishments that exceed the
actual injury done by (or profit obtained by) the tortfeasor or criminal, is that they are necessary to deter torts
or crimes that are concealable.”).
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Graph & Table 4: Private and Social Costs in a Negligence Regime When the
Probability of Paying Damages Is 0.1

† Indicates the level of precautionary spending that minimizes the shipper’s costs
* Represents the socially optimal investment in precautions

The result is a serious misalignment between the level of care that is
optimal for the shipper and the level optimal for society. Here, punitive
damages must be assessed to restore the alignment between social and private
costs. The conclusion, therefore, is not that punitive damages are always or
never appropriate in negligence regimes, but that they must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether circumstances or misconduct have
made it more profitable for the tortfeasor to spend less than the socially
optimal amount on precautions.110 Fortunately, when a divergence of

110 This determination could require some rather complex calculations, but this Comment maintains that
only a case-by-case method for assessing punitive damages in negligence cases will achieve efficient results.
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optimums111 occurs—whether in strict liability or in negligence—the
alignment of costs can be restored by multiplying the damages payment by the
reciprocal of the probability of detection, thus charging the tortfeasor
“punitive” damages each time the tortfeasor is caught.112 Multiplying the
damages in Table 2 by four would undo the effects of the 0.25 probability of
not paying damages, essentially recreating the scheme in Table 1. If punitive
damages were calculated in this manner, the shipper would once again spend
the optimal amount on precautions. Even after this correction, a distributional
problem remains because the shipper will pay four times as much to a quarter
as many plaintiffs, while three-quarters of the victims receive nothing. But
interestingly, the distributional inequalities among the injured may lead to an
increase in the probability of detection: publicity from lawsuits with high
damages, combined with communication among plaintiffs and others who have
been injured, will perhaps give the remaining three quarters of potential
plaintiffs sufficient information and incentive to sue.113 When it becomes
apparent that the probability of detection has increased, punitive damages
should be lowered to avoid over-deterrence and unnecessarily large penalties.
4. Punitive Damages for Reckless Conduct
Economically speaking, conduct is “reckless” when a tortfeasor refuses to
take basic precautions despite very high expected accident costs.114 In terms of
the familiar variables, B is relatively low while P x L is high.115 Suppose that
in the ChemShip scenario described above, the probability of an accident
occurring could be reduced tenfold with an expenditure of only $5,000, but
111 For example, a divergence of optimums occurs when social and private costs vary in such a way that
the potential injurer is better off taking a socially inefficient level of precaution.
112 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 874. Interestingly, in some cases a punitive award along these
lines will be justified even if the tortfeasor’s conduct implies no culpability. In such situations, there is a
genuine disconnect between the rationales of retribution and deterrence. See infra Part III.C.
113 Cf. Barbara Pressley Noble, At Work; The Legacy of Jack McGann, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, § 3, at
27 (reporting that a single case filed against an employer for discriminatory termination of insurance benefits
helped turn the issue into a cause célèbre).
114 FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 208 (“Part of what makes us describe a tort as reckless is the failure of
the tortfeasor to take even the simplest and most obvious precautions.”); POSNER, supra note 80, at 207. Noneconomic formulations of recklessness are less precise. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, § 34, at 214
(“[T]here is often no clear distinction at all between such [willful, wanton, or reckless] conduct and ‘gross’
negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same meaning, of an aggravated form of
negligence, differing in quality rather than in degree from ordinary lack of care.”).
115 POSNER, supra note 80, at 207–09 (“B is positive but extremely low, while P and L are both extremely
high.”). Judge Posner’s assertion that both P and L are extremely high does not make much sense. Even in his
example, it seems unlikely that P would be “extremely” high. It seems more reasonable to judge recklessness
based on the percentage difference between B and P x L.
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ChemShip does not make this investment. Here, the presupposition of
rationality collapses because it seems clear that the shipper is not minimizing
its private costs. Perhaps company managers consider safety precautions to be
contrary to a “macho” business ethic, or perhaps management is risk-loving.116
Similarly, profits may be so high that company decision makers do not
consider $1 million in damages to be worth their attention.117 If, for example,
the company is earning $1 billion in yearly profits, then as long as managers
can be sure they will have to pay only $1 million in the case of an accident,
they may not spend time worrying about such contingencies. Even with no
precautions, expected damages would only be $50,000, and assuming punitive
damages are not awarded, this is indeed a “trifling” sum118 compared to $1
billion in profits. Management’s attention is not an unlimited resource,119 and
if investments of attention in matters other than controlling damages seem
likely to pay a higher reward, safety may not be prioritized. Thus, a scarcity of
managerial attention could explain a company’s failure to take obviously
efficient precautions.
Since reckless conduct is by definition inefficient, concerns with overdeterrence do not come into play.120 Reckless conduct is also easy to avoid,
since B is low.121 The cognitive errors described above, including the
irrational attitude towards safety, but especially an extremely profitable firm’s
116 Craig S. Lerner & Moin A. Yahya, “Left Behind” After Sarbanes-Oxley, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1383,
1386 (2007) (contrasting “bean counters” with “swashbucklers—that is, people who are risk-neutral with those
who are possibly risk-loving with respect to business matters and legal compliance”).
117 Cf. Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy,
101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 514 (2002) (“Profitability and growth are frequently the focus of entrants’ attention,
the very factors that lead many of them to embark on new ventures. Although entrants will not analyze these
factors perfectly, given their bounded rationality, entrants will nevertheless focus much attention on them.
Entrants are likely to ignore other background variables . . . especially if these variables do not affect entrants’
ability to embark on a new venture but ‘only’ the venture’s prospects. The analysis of such variables, if done
at all, would therefore be more likely to fall prey to the processes of overconfidence, leading entrants to exhibit
a relative insensitivity to their presence.”).
118 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
119 JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS HAPPEN 10 (1994) (“Time and
capabilities for attention are limited. Not everything can be attended to at once. Too many signals are
received. Too many things are relevant to a decision. Because of these limitations, theories of decision
making are often better described as theories of attention or search than as theories of choice. They are
concerned with the way in which scarce attention is allocated.”).
120 FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 208 (“Part of what makes us describe a tort as reckless is the failure of
the tortfeasor to take even the simplest and most obvious precautions. That suggests that his behavior was
clearly inefficient, so we need not worry about over deterring it.”).
121 POSNER, supra note 80, at 207 (“Take the case of recklessness. I decide to rest my eyes while driving,
and plow at high speed into a flock of pedestrians. B is positive but extremely low, while P and L are both
extremely high.”).
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failure to consider inefficiencies that are small in comparison to profits, can be
overcome by assessing punitive damages.122 The amount of punitive damages
should be based on contextual factors such as whether the tortfeasor
demonstrated risk-loving behavior or failed to take precautions because profits
were so high that harms seemed minimal in comparison. Punitive damages
should be calibrated to send a signal to the tortfeasor and to other similarly
situated actors that will overcome their cognitive biases by showing that
reckless disregard for safety measures can result in serious financial
consequences.
5. Punitive Damages Against Corporations
Some scholars have suggested that punitive damages should not be
assessed against corporations123 because (1) punishment of corporate entities
fails to punish the responsible parties,124 (2) the desire to punish a “legal
fiction” such as a corporation is incoherent,125 and (3) punitive damages do not
deter corporations.126 This subsection will explain why each of these claims
are unpersuasive.
The first argument states that punitive damages assessed against
corporations fail to serve a retributive function since the wrong individuals—
stockholders and customers—bear the brunt of the punishment rather than the
truly responsible parties—managers and directors.127 There are several
objections to this argument. First, customers may not be hurt at all because
firms (especially large corporations able to charge monopoly or quasimonopoly prices) may be both willing and able to reduce prices after litigation

122 See Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach to Show that
the Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More than Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REV.
53, 69 (2006) (“Now, suppose that the individual is risk-loving. . . . [T]here exists a penalty that will deter a
risk-loving individual, but the penalty required to deter [is] about 70% higher than what [is] needed to deter the
risk-averse individual.”).
123 E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental
and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 335 (1998) (arguing that punitive damages fail to incentivize risk-reducing
behavior in corporations).
124 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 949.
125 Id. (“We find this conception of the punishment goal unappealing . . . because it necessitates believing
that people would, after reflecting on the matter, want to impose a penalty on what ultimately is an artificial
legal construct. The notion that individuals would want to punish firms per se strikes us as not entirely
different from the idea that individuals would want to punish inanimate objects for causing harm . . . .”).
126 Viscusi, supra note 123, at 288.
127 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 949.
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and attendant bad publicity in order to lure back customers.128 Second,
stockholders are not completely blameless because they are able to choose
whose stock to buy, and they have power over the management of the
corporation.129 Accordingly, stockholders share a portion of the responsibility,
and a drop in share prices is the deserved consequence of investing in a
company with a poor safety record.130 Finally, large punitive damages
assessments against corporations will in fact result in the punishment of
responsible parties whether the responsible parties are managers or low-level
employees. If a manager was responsible for the harm that resulted in punitive
damages liability, a rational board of directors would fire the manager,131 and,
similarly, a low-level employee would likely be fired132 and possibly
imprisoned if the acts were criminal.133
The second argument against awarding punitive damages for corporate
misconduct states that the desire to punish a corporation is incoherent since
corporations are legal constructs and cannot be “responsible” in the same
manner as natural persons.134 Both legal history and common experience belie
this argument. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., argued in The Common
Law, long before modern concepts of liability emerged, early legal systems
sometimes “punished” inanimate objects.135 However, regardless whether

128 See Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and
Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 27 (2006) (“[P]harmaceutical
companies routinely sell pharmaceuticals at heavily reduced prices to developing countries in order to promote
goodwill and, in all probability, to counter the negative publicity the industry has received in recent years.”).
129 In fact, some have noted that shareholder voting power is on the rise. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax,
Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder
Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (“This examination reveals not only that shareholders have become
more active within recent years, but also that their activism has had an impact on corporate affairs.”).
130 Moreover, allowing punitive damages to be imposed against corporations that act reprehensibly could
encourage ethical investing. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733, 784 (2005) (“An increasing number of investors now put their money in funds committed to
avoid investments in corporations that create environmental harms . . . .”).
131 Cf. Stephanie E. Tanger, Enforcing Corporate Responsibility for Violations of Workplace Immigration
Laws: The Case of Meatpacking, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 59, 79 (2006) (“In response to the lawsuit, Tyson
fired the managers who pled guilty and claimed to redouble its efforts . . . .”).
132 Often, low-level employees will be judgment-proof. This in turn provides part of the economic
justification for the rule of respondeat superior. See POSNER, supra note 80, at 188 (“[M]ost employees lack
the resources to pay a judgment . . . .”).
133 For instance, Exxon fired Captain Hazelwood soon after the Valdez oil spill, and he also faced criminal
prosecution. Exxon Valdez Trial to Be Held in Anchorage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1989, § 1, at 27.
134 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 949.
135 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 8–38 (Dover 1991) (1881). As Justice Holmes
explained:
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ancient law saw fit to punish inanimate objects, a corporation is, in fact, much
closer to a human being than to an axe or a stone.136 Thus, a fortiori,
punishing a corporate entity—with its ability to buy and sell, to produce goods,
to own property, to “remember” through institutional memory, and to “think”
through its managers—is far from incoherent. Punishment alters corporate
behavior, just as it does the conduct of a natural person.137
The third argument against assessing punitive damages for corporate
misconduct states that punitive damages do not induce corporations to reduce
risks.138 W. Kip Viscusi has used this argument to buttress the claim that
punitive damages awards should be eliminated against corporations in cases
involving risk and environmental decisions.139 Using cost–benefit analysis to
assess the value of punitive damages,140 Viscusi contends that (1) “punitive
damages have no significant deterrent effect,”141 (2) “eliminating risk becomes
inordinately costly,”142 (3) “compensatory damages are generally adequate for

We have now followed the development of the chief forms of liability in modern law for
anything other than the immediate and manifest consequences of a man’s own acts. . . . We have
seen a single germ multiplying and branching into products as different from each other as the
flower from the root. It hardly remains to ask what that germ was. We have seen that it was the
desire of retaliation against the offending thing itself. . . . A consideration of the earliest
instances will show, as might have been expected, that vengeance, not compensation, and
vengeance on the offending thing, was the original object. The ox in Exodus was to be stoned.
The axe in the Athenian law was to be banished. The tree, in Mr. Tylor’s instance, was to be
chopped to pieces.
Id. at 34.
136 Business law also gives corporations many of the legal rights enjoyed by natural persons. See Santa
Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (“The court does not wish to hear argument on the
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all
of opinion that it does.” (quoting Chief Justice Waite)) (syllabus). This adds strength to the argument that
corporate “persons”—and not only natural persons—should face the possibility of economic punishment
through punitive damages.
137 See Bert Swart, International Trends Towards Establishing Some Form of Punishment for
Corporations, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 947, 951–52 (2008) (“[C]orporations have their own institutional
memories. They can remember things that happened in the past and learn from their experiences. They can
correct their policies if they have made mistakes, or if circumstances make it desirable for them to change
them. So far as their relationship with the law is concerned, they can make free choices about whether or not
to comply with the law. Their freedom of choice in this respect makes it both possible and justifiable to hold
them accountable for their choices. Experience also shows that sanctions imposed on corporations for having
violated the law often induce them to adjust their goals or policies in order to prevent repetition.”).
138 Viscusi, supra note 123, at 288.
139 Id. at 335.
140 Id. at 286–87.
141 Id. at 288.
142 Id. at 307.
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deterrence,”143 (4) “market forces promote safety,”144 and (5) “punitive
damages cause economic harm.”145 On closer examination, Viscusi’s
arguments are self-contradictory. The claim that “punitive damages have no
significant deterrent effect” is incompatible with the claim that “[t]he high
stakes and high variability of punitive damage awards are of substantial
concern to companies.”146
When profit-maximizing companies are
substantially concerned about something that could affect their bottom line,
they generally take steps to prevent it from happening.147 This is how
deterrence works to minimize risks in the business context.148 Besides, since
reckless or intentional conduct is generally a prerequisite for an award of
punitive damages,149 it is hard to see how, if punitive damages impose a
“catastrophic threat,”150 punitive damages would not deter reckless—and
therefore easily avoidable—conduct. Furthermore, the claim that punitive
damages will not prompt corporations to be more cautious is especially
doubtful in light of evidence suggesting that legal liability is perhaps the
greatest factor inducing corporations to design safer products.151
A final consideration regarding punitive damages and corporate conduct
relates to corporate attitudes toward risk. Some scholars maintain that
143

Id. at 310.
Id. at 315.
145 Id. at 322.
146 See id. at 285. Viscusi, however, argues that punitive damages are assessed more or less at random,
making it impossible for a corporation to respond to the threat of punitive damages liability by spending more
on precautions. Id. at 309.
147 See, e.g., David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV. 393, 408
(2008) (describing the “laser focus on the bottom line” that characterizes private business).
148 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 554 (2005) (“To
understand how deterrence works, one must take an ex ante perspective. . . . As is well known, people can be
given optimal incentives to take care if they are required to pay damages for any financial losses that they
cause . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
149 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, § 2, at 9–10 (“Something more than the mere commission of a tort
is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage . . . or such a
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called willful or wanton.”
(footnotes omitted)); id. § 35, at 212–13 (explaining that conduct labeled as “willful,” “wanton,” or “reckless”
remains, “at essence, negligent, rather than actually intended to do harm,” yet “is held to justify an award of
punitive damages” (footnote omitted)).
150 Viscusi, supra note 123, at 285.
151 See Sandra F. Gavin, Stealth Tort Reform, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 431, 438 (2008) (“In 1983, the Rand
Institute studied the ‘serious public policy problem, namely the manufacture of products that may have been
unreasonably dangerous to their users[,]’ to determine what external pressures had the greatest influence on
promoting products safety and concluded, ‘[o]f all the various external social pressures, product liability has
the greatest influence on product design decisions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting GEORGE EADS & PETER
REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS, CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND
REGULATION, at iii–viii (1983))).
144
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corporations are “risk-neutral,”152 while most individuals are “risk-averse.”
Accordingly, damages need not be as high for individuals to ensure the
appropriate level of deterrence.153 Thus, it may be economically justifiable to
set damages at a higher level when the defendant is a corporation.
B. Retributivist Arguments
The literature on retributivist justifications for punitive damages is
extensive and provides a refreshing (and perhaps necessary) contrast to the
economic literature;154 indeed, it seems unlikely that economic theories will
ever adequately explain punitive damages if such damages are to retain a
genuinely punitive character.155 Even Judge Posner admits that wealthmaximizing theories of law and economics are limited as a tool for the
explanation and generation of legal rules.156 Thus, retributivist modes of
understanding punitive damages are essential to a complete understanding of
the role of punitive damages in tort law.
1. Standing Up to Giants
In Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, Marc Galanter
and David Luban provide an eloquent defense of punitive damages without
relying on economic concepts.157 In their view, punitive damages are “perhaps
the most important instrument in the legal repertoire for pronouncing moral
disapproval of economically formidable offenders.”158 All other legal
sanctions, they argue, fail to carry moral force adequate to address the
152

Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 887 n.44.
Id. at 886–87.
154 See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 10; Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive
Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005).
155 George P. Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1985) (“The criteria
of crime, criminal responsibility, and punishment have yet to receive an adequate account in the literature of
law and economics.”).
156 POSNER, supra note 80, at 216 (“But the fact that any sort of rape license is even thinkable within the
framework of the wealth-maximization theory that guides so much of the analysis in this book is a limitation
on the usefulness of that theory. What generates the possibility of a rape license is that fact that the rapist’s
utility is weighted the same as his victim’s utility. If it were given a zero weight in the calculus of costs and
benefits, a rape license could not be efficient. The only persuasive basis for such a weighting, however, would
be a moral principle different from efficiency.” (emphasis added)). For other examples of moral atrocities that
a theory based purely on economic efficiency would recommend, see id. at 11, 12, 27.
157 Galanter & Luban, supra note 10.
158 Id. at 1428.
153
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implications of the underlying conduct.159 Although Galanter and Luban agree
with economically minded reformers who maintain that punitive damages
should not be “utterly discretionary and without limits,” their reasoning
differs.160 In their view, punitive damages should be limited “not because
completely discretionary punitive damages are economically harmful, as tort
reformers typically claim, but rather because retribution demands penalties that
bear a significant relation to the nature of the wrongdoing.”161 In a rebuff to
the economic logic of punitive damages, Galanter and Luban claim that “[c]ivil
punishments . . . reinforce the notion of law as a realm of moral achievement
rather than technical adjustment.”162
Galanter and Luban are directly on point when they argue that retributive
concerns, which address the “heinousness of the offense,” are fundamentally
undermined when punitive awards are keyed to the amount of compensatory
damages163 because heinous acts may not cause significant compensatory
damages.164 For instance, “cold-bloodedly throwing a child out of a skyscraper
window may result in very little harm because the child’s suspenders
miraculously catch on a flagpole.”165 Because of these concerns, Galanter and
Luban maintain that retribution and a one-to-one cap are incompatible, and
they reject proposals to cap punitive damages at a multiple of compensatory
damages.166 The Court’s endorsement of the retributivist rationale in Exxon
Shipping thus rings hollow when compared with Galanter and Luban’s
thoughtful analysis of the moral implications of punitive damages.
2. The Benefits of “Wild” Awards
According to Jeffrey White, punitive damages serve a useful social
function in the law of torts because they allow the community to express its
moral condemnation of the defendant’s misconduct.167 What is more, judges
159

Id.
Id. at 1461.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1428 (emphasis added).
163 Id. at 1432 (“A retributivist scales punishment to the heinousness of the offense, and that is not
measured by the magnitude of harm.”).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1461 (“In our view, the limits of punitive damages have to do entirely with the heinousness of
the wrongful act; they have nothing to do with the size of compensatory awards. Thus, we oppose proposals to
cap punitive damages at some small multiple of compensatory damages.”).
167 Jeffrey R. White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 79, 79
(2005) (“Nowhere does the civil jury speak louder than when it awards punitive damages against a defendant
160
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help to limit the potential economic harm of excessive jury awards. According
to David Partlett, “Judges, as repeat players, may exercise the corrective
function by outlying verdicts in accord with the equity notion that like cases
should be treated alike.”168 Moreover, “Judges . . . in motions for remitter and
on appeal, may act as an appropriate corrective.”169
Similar to White and Galanter and Luban, Partlett also remarks that a jury’s
assertion of “community outrage about the flouting of a right is not a symptom
of the illness of the system[,]” because “[e]ven the outrageous punitive award
establishes a healthy dialogue where the wronged citizen is accorded respect
and the wrongdoer suffers punishment for his or her misdeeds.”170 In
conclusion, scholars and judges who ignore the retributivist rationale of
punitive damages ignore a well-established line of legal tradition that is closely
tied to common notions of fairness.171
C. Synthesis
The foregoing analysis indicates that punitive damages must occasionally
exceed compensatory damages by a considerable margin. Exxon Shipping’s
one-to-one cap unduly fetters punitive damages and will interfere with
deterrence and retributivist goals.
Accordingly, a one-to-one cap is
inappropriate if deterrence and retribution are taken as goals of tort law.
Although tensions exist between deterrence and retribution,172 in most cases
the two rationales overlap—especially in cases of reckless conduct.
1. Overlapping Rationales
Since punitive damages are generally restricted to situations in which the
tortfeasor has behaved recklessly or intentionally,173 the divide between
retributivist and economic rationales for punitive damages can easily be
who has violated our common understanding of acceptable behavior. The jury verdict speaks as the
conscience of the community.”).
168 David F. Partlett, The Republican Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1409, 1427
(2004).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 171 (2004)
(“Jurors are intuitive retributivists . . . .”).
172 Drumbl, supra note 11, at 577 (“[T]he goals of deterrence . . . may well conflict with those of
retribution . . . .”).
173 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 106, § 2, at 9 (“Something more than the mere commission of a tort is
always required for punitive damages.”).
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bridged. As argued above, one of the least problematic arguments for
assessing punitive damages applies when the defendant’s conduct is
reckless.174 Similarly, reckless conduct is blameworthy from a retributivist
perspective because it suggests that the defendant places a low value on the
safety of others.175 Thus, proponents of both the retributivist rationale and the
economic rationale agree that punitive damages should be awarded for reckless
conduct. Economic arguments would additionally support an assessment of
punitive damages for less culpable defendants who are frequently able to
escape liability.176 In such cases, where less culpable conduct nevertheless
supports an award of punitive damages, judges could instruct juries that a
punitive damages award will cause the defendant, and potential defendants, to
exercise due care and that the award eventually may help other victims to
receive compensation.
2. Quantitative Concerns
In Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Polinsky and Shavell argue
that when deterrence and retributivist concerns support differing amounts of
punitive damages, the best solution is to find a compromise.177 However,
genuine difficulties exist in calculating the amount of punitive damages when
retribution is the purpose. As Galanter and Luban suggest, “The magnitude of
punishment must reflect the magnitude and, if possible, the nature of the
asserted inequality between wrongdoer and victim.”178 Clarifying this point,
they add that “[a] more heinous act expresses more contempt for the victim’s
value relative to the wrongdoer’s, and so the retributivist believes that a more
decisive defeat must be visited on the wrongdoer to reassert the public’s
judgment of the victim’s worth.”179 Unfortunately, Galanter and Luban
provide little guidance for arriving at the specific dollar amount necessary to
effect a “decisive defeat.” However, given that outrageous yet unintentional
conduct is likely to be at least reckless, even an excessive award by the jury
does not raise substantial economic concerns—the concept of over-deterrence

174

See supra Part III.A.3.
See, e.g., Reeves v. Carlson, 969 P.2d 252, 256 (Kan. 1998) (“To be reckless, conduct must be such as
to show disregard of or indifference to consequences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety of
others.”).
176 See supra Part III.
177 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 71, at 955 (“It is evident that the best level of punitive damages should
be a compromise between the levels that are optimal when each objective is considered independently.”).
178 Galanter & Luban, supra note 10, at 1432.
179 Id. at 1433.
175
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does not apply to reckless conduct because the optimal level of reckless
conduct is zero. Thus, the jury’s reasoned choice of an amount of damages,
though unguided by numerical rules, will not cause economic harm in cases of
recklessness.
IV. EXXON SHIPPING CO. V. BAKER: A SUSPECT ANALYSIS
This Part returns to the Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping. The first
section summarizes the relevant portions of the majority opinion. The second
section critiques the majority opinion and suggests how the Court went wrong
in crafting its overly restrictive one-to-one rule.
A. The Majority Opinion
At trial, the Alaska federal district court certified a mandatory class for the
more than 32,000 plaintiffs seeking punitive damages against Exxon.180 The
jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages to the class of
commercial fishermen181 and $5 billion in punitive damages.182 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case twice because the punitive damages award did
not meet the due process standards set by the Supreme Court in its
constitutional punitive damages cases.183 Ultimately, the circuit court remitted
the punitive award to $2.5 billion.184
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider several issues, including
whether the $2.5 billion award was excessive as a matter of maritime common
law,185 a branch of law “which falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to
decide in the manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of
Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.”186
Although the Court noted that the question of punitive damages in the context
of maritime law was an issue of first impression,187 the majority opinion
frequently cited constitutional punitive damages cases, not maritime cases or
principles.188
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
Id. at 2614.
Id. The jury awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against the Valdez’s captain. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2611.
Id. at 2619.
Id.
Id., passim.
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In a lengthy survey of punitive damages law,189 the Court emphasized that
the “real problem” with punitive damage awards is their “stark
unpredictability.”190 In its review of the Ninth Circuit’s $2.5 billion award, the
Court specified that its analysis was based on maritime law, and it was
therefore unnecessary to apply the constitutional doctrines outlined in State
Farm.191 The Court then reasoned that “the unpredictability of high punitive
awards . . . is in tension with the function of the awards as
punitive . . . .”192 According to the majority, an “eccentrically high punitive
verdict” carries “an implication of unfairness . . . in a system whose commonly
held notion of law rests on a sense of fairness in dealing with one another.”193
The Court cited Justice Holmes’s essay, The Path of the Law,194 in support
of the proposition that “a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its
severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or
another.”195 In searching for a rule of law that would reduce or remove
189

Id. at 2620–25.
Id. at 2625.
191 Id. at 2626. The Court did not apply the Gore guideposts—reprehensibility, disparity, comparison to
civil penalties—as required by the due process punitive damages cases. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (setting forth the guideposts).
192 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2627.
193 Id.
194 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). Justice Holmes was then
serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Id. at 457.
195 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2627. This argument is not universally accepted. According to Jeffrey
R. White:
190

Business practices and corporate decisions require cost planning and consideration of potential
liability exposure. Unpredictable punitive damage awards are an unwelcome wild card.
This argument received a cool reception in state courts in the 1980s. Many took the view
expressed by the Maine Supreme Court [in Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1359 (Me. 1985),]
that “the lack of any precise formula by which punitive damages can be calculated is one of the
important assets of the doctrine.” As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained [in Fischer v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 477 (N.J. 1986)]:
Anticipation of these damages will allow potential defendants, aware of
dangers of a product, to factor those anticipated damages into a costbenefit analysis and to decide whether to market a particular product. The
risk and amount of such damages can, and in some cases will, be reflected
in the cost of a product, in which event the product will be marketed in its
dangerous condition.
Thus, [according to Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984)], ‘[i]f
punitive damages are predictably certain, they become just another item in the cost of doing
business.’ That result defeats the purpose of punitive damages in deterring misconduct and turns
them into a user fee that permits defendants to continue their misconduct for a price.
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entirely the unpredictability that made punitive damages awards problematic,
the Court rejected the verbal formulae adopted by various state courts196 and
remarked that “eliminating unpredictable outlying punitive awards by more
rigorous standards than the constitutional limit” would likely be best achieved
in a way analogous to the “criminal-law pattern of quantified limits.”197 The
Court eventually ruled that “a [one-to-one] ratio, which is above the median
award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.”198
B. Critiques
This section argues that the Court’s reasoning in Exxon Shipping suffers
from serious flaws. First, the majority reasoned from a single anecdote (and a
lack of confirming studies) that punitive damages are unpredictable and thus in
need of reform. Second, the majority misread and misused statistics to justify
capping punitive damages at a one-to-one ratio. Finally, the majority largely
ignored deterrence and retributivist rationales for punitive damages.
1. Drawing an Inference from an Anecdote

One of the more puzzling aspects of the Court’s opinion is its crafting of a
new rule to address a situation that even the Court seemed to identify as
unproblematic. The Court noted that although punitive damages have “been
the target of audible criticism in recent decades . . . . [a] survey of the literature
reveals that discretion to award . . . punitive damages has not mass-produced
runaway awards . . . .”199 Moreover, “The figures thus show an overall
restraint . . . .”200 One study cited by the Court201 observed that “[p]unitive
damages are infrequent, typically for small sums, and concentrated primarily in
contract-related cases.”202 According to the Court, however, these studies
obscured the more subtle problem of the unpredictability of punitive
damages.203

White, supra note 167, at 88 (footnotes omitted).
196 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2628–29.
197 Id. at 2629.
198 Id. at 2629–33.
199 Id. at 2624.
200 Id. at 2624–25.
201 Id. at 2625.
202 Brian J. Ostrom, et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79
JUDICATURE 233, 238 (1996).
203 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2625.
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The Court stated that variability in the size of punitive awards, and in the
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, could only be acceptable if
it resulted from judges and juries adopting a measured approach that tended to
produce both consistent and optimal levels of damages in cases with similar
facts.204 However, the Court noted that “anecdotal evidence suggests that
nothing of that sort is going on.”205 This assertion was based on the
examination of a single anecdote from prior case law: An Alabama jury
awarded a plaintiff $4 million in punitive damages, while in a different
Alabama case with “strikingly similar facts,” no punitive damages were
awarded.206 Remarkably, on the basis of this single anecdote and the Court’s
further observation that it was not aware of any “scholarly work pointing to
consistency across punitive awards in cases involving similar claims and
circumstances,”207 the Court concluded that the unpredictability of punitive
damages was an established fact.208
However, the Court’s conclusion that punitive damages are unpredictable
simply does not follow from these facts. Even if the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages varied wildly, this would not prove that punitive
damages are unpredictable. Some other factor (or set of factors) could be
responsible for the variation, and the level of punitive damages could perhaps
be predicted quite accurately if these other factors were properly understood.
The Court’s reasoning could be compared to an argument stating that because

204 Id. However, the facts in two cases will never be exactly the same. See George Priest, Introduction to
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 1, 2 (2002) (“The magnitude of punitive
damages verdicts appears to vary substantially across juries. But this judgment, too, is problematic. In some
sense, no two cases are alike. Thus, there is an inherent difficulty in evaluating one verdict against
another . . . .”).
205 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2625–26.
206 Id. at 2626. The case involving the $4 million award is BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559 (1996), the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a state court award of punitive damages.
The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 145, 150 (1996). Not only is it a
weak form of argumentation to rely on anecdotal evidence—much less a single anecdote—but the Court
avoided mentioning that the Alabama Supreme Court remitted the damages to $2 million, and then, after the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the award, the Alabama Supreme Court again remitted the award, this time to
just $50,000. Thus, the Court exaggerated the true disparity between awards in the two cases. In addition,
selecting a case decided before the Court clarified its punitive damages jurisprudence in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), is misleading. In Exxon Shipping, the Court
assessed the supposed inadequacy of the law in 2008, and BMW likely would have been decided differently if
it had been heard after State Farm. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53
EMORY L.J. 1405, 1420–26 (2004) (discussing the effect of State Farm on large punitive damages awards).
207 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
208 Id. at 2625–34.
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the height of law students is not correlated with academic performance, then
student performance in law school is unpredictable.
Moreover, the Court’s emphasis on predictability is misplaced, since
punitive damages could be predictable but based on the wrong factors.209 For
example, if a study were to find that defendants’ wealth is the key determinant
of punitive damages, then—assuming considerations of a defendant’s wealth
are unprincipled or against public policy—there would be a serious reason for
reforming the system even though damages were highly predictable.
Nevertheless, the Court failed to show that punitive damages actually are
unpredictable. A single anecdote is not enough, and since the Court’s one-toone rule is supposedly justified by the need to eliminate the unpredictability of
punitive damages awards, the rule itself is called into question.
2. The Court’s Misuse of Statistical Evidence

Commentators have already criticized the Court’s use of statistics in Exxon
Shipping.210 The following statement shows how the Court misused statistics:
“[B]y most accounts the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has
remained less than [one-to-one] . . . . The figures . . . suggest that in many
instances a high ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is substantially
greater than necessary to punish or deter.”211 This statement exemplifies the
use of a measure of central tendency (the median ratio of compensatory to
209 See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive
Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 527, 529 (1999) (“An additional concern is not just whether punitive
damages are predictable, but whether they are predictable for the right reasons.”).
210 The Supreme Court has frequently relied on statistical studies. See Adam Liptak, From One Footnote,
a Debate over the Tangles of Law, Science and Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at A16 (“The Supreme
Court has often considered academic studies in its decisions, starting with Louis D. Brandeis’s famous 1908
brief collecting medical and other evidence to support laws limiting work hours. Lawyers still call such
submissions ‘Brandeis briefs.’ The court’s signal triumph, Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, cited studies
from psychologists and others, and citations to empirical work are commonplace these days.”). However, the
Court’s use of the studies it cited in Exxon Shipping has already drawn heavy criticism:

“The opinion reads like a bad joke,” said Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, a law professor at Cornell.
“They say they know of no study showing punitive damages are orderly in any way, and yet they
cite” a study by Theodore Eisenberg, a prominent empirical legal studies scholar at Cornell,
“showing punitive damages are pretty orderly.”
Professor Eisenberg struggled to stay respectful about the [C]ourt’s approach to his
work . . . . He finally settled on this phrase: “I believe the [C]ourt went seriously astray” in
concluding that his work supported a reduced award.
Id.
211

Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2624–25 (emphasis added).
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punitive damages) to indicate what is desirable from an instrumentalist
perspective. To see the fallacy of this reasoning, consider that punitive
damages serve the functions of punishment and deterrence and that for many
of the reasons described in this Comment (such as a low probability of paying
damages, recklessness, or morally outrageous disregard for others’ safety), a
higher ratio is often required.
The Court embraces this fallacy in holding that punitive damages in cases
of recklessness should be capped at one-to-one. The Court’s argument is
simple: Since most of the time judges and juries award punitive damages such
that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is less than one-to-one, then
a one-to-one ratio is a “fair upper limit.”212 As stated before, this is an illogical
argument. The Court’s justification for capping the ratio at one-to-one is
formally equivalent to an argument that since the average criminal goes to jail
for fifty months,213 then no criminal shall serve a longer sentence. In
conclusion, the Court’s assertion that punitive damages are unpredictable is
unwarranted based on the data the Court examined. Moreover, the Court
compounds the error by creating a rule in which a ratio based on the median is
applied in a sweeping manner to all cases of reckless conduct.
3. The Court’s Failure to Consider Either Deterrence or Retribution
In Exxon Shipping, the Court failed to consider the consequences of its oneto-one cap. As the economic analysis of punitive damages in Part III of this
Comment reveals, total damages often must be increased by adding punitive
damages when the probability is less than 1.0 that the defendant will pay
compensatory damages. Regrettably, the Court’s one-to-one rule will only
provide adequate deterrence when the chance of paying damages is fifty
percent or greater.214 Worse, a one-to-one cap will diminish the ability of
punitive damages to minimize reckless conduct.215 In sum, the Court in Exxon
212

Id. at 2633.
Sentencing-Guideline Study Finds Continuing Disparities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004, at A11
(describing study by U.S. Sentencing Commission finding that the average federal prison inmate’s sentence is
fifty months).
214 A one-to-one cap will only allow total damages to be twice the amount of compensatory damages. As
explained in Part III, when the probability of the defendant paying damages is only 0.5, then (assuming the
reward for negligence does not already provide the defendant an adequate incentive to take efficient
precautions) compensatory damages must be multiplied by two. If the odds of paying damages were any less
than 0.5, then a one-to-one cap would prevent the tort system from charging the defendant enough to ensure
that private and social costs do not continue to diverge.
215 The one-to-one cap will be especially harmful when compensatory damages are low or when the
defendant’s taste for risk warrants significantly higher damages. See supra Part III.
213
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Shipping almost completely ignored the economic and deterrence-based
rationales for punitive damages.
Additionally, the Court refused to acknowledge the strong retributive
concerns present in the case. The opinion ignores the well-documented
devastation of the Alaskan environment and the oil spill’s damaging effects on
the lives and livelihoods of those Alaskans and Native Americans living
nearby. Given that the Court has endorsed retribution as a justification for
punitive damages,216 it is puzzling that it would fail to mention facts that show
the blameworthiness of the defendant.217 Moreover, since the district court
created a mandatory punitive damages class, it is difficult to see why Exxon’s
punishment-worthy conduct should have been so narrowly circumscribed.218
Even if there was a procedural bar to considering certain elements of Exxon’s
conduct for purposes of increasing or maintaining the punitive damages award,
the company’s reckless acts still warranted more detailed description in the
opinion. An examination of facts the Court failed to mention reveals a much
more shocking picture of the human and environmental costs of the spill,219 as
well as Exxon’s obstructionist legal strategy,220 and the deceitfulness of the
company toward those who were harmed.221 On the other hand, the Court
216 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (“[T]he consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at
compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”).
217 Some felt that the Court hardly acknowledged Exxon’s blameworthiness. See Adam Liptak, Damages
Cut Against Exxon in Valdez Case, N.Y TIMES, June 26, 2008, at A1 (“Jeffrey L. Fisher, a lawyer for the
plaintiffs, said there was ‘a great deal of sadness’ among his clients. ‘What is painful,’ Mr. Fisher said, ‘is that
there seems to have been some disagreement between the dissenters and the majority on how reprehensible
Exxon’s conduct was.’”). Some scholars have argued that the Court was already ignoring the retributivist
rationale for punitive damages before Exxon Shipping was decided. See Paul J. Zwier, The Utility of a
Nonconsequentialist Rationale for Civil Jury-Awarded Punitive Damages, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 404 (2006)
(describing “the harm the Court inflicts by minimizing the retributive justification and usurping the discretion
of the jury” and arguing that “the Court backhandedly endorsed the law and economics, or deterrence, model
of punishment and ignored the broader effects on social norms and values that result from taking the
retribution analysis out of the hands of a common law jury”).
218 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2613.
219 See supra Part I.
220 See Denise E. Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric and Reality: An Integrated Empirical Analysis
of Punitive Damages Judgments in Hawaii, 1985–2001, 20 J.L. & POL. 143, 148 (2004) (“[C]onsumer
advocate Ralph Nader decried Exxon’s failure to pay the award more than a decade after the verdict, calling
the company’s response to the award ‘a legal war of attrition, while thousands of Alaskans and others
suffered.’” (quoting Ralph Nader, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, Oct. 9, 2000,
http://www.commondreams.org/views/101000-109.htm)).
221 See, e.g., OTT, supra note 14, at 23 (reporting that in the effort to get the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
permit, “Exxon’s Ken Fountain told lobbyists, ‘I don’t care if every goddamn fish dies, get that [authorization]
permit . . . .’”). Some of Exxon’s methods for cleaning up the spill oil were harmful to the environment and to
the health of cleanup workers, and an Exxon official admitted that the actual cleanup was secondary to “its
public image aspects.” Id. at 52 (describing how the high-pressure “hot-water wash” used to clean the
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notes that Exxon spent billions on voluntary cleanup efforts222 (though some
commentators have described these efforts as counterproductive, unsafe, and
predominately motivated by public relations concerns).223 If evidence of the
resources spent on cleanup was admissible to mitigate the award, it is hard to
see why other post-spill facts relating to Exxon’s blameworthiness for
damaging the environment were not admissible to at least maintain the jury’s
punitive damages award.
Pre-spill facts are particularly relevant to assessing the reprehensibility of
Exxon’s conduct. For example, oil companies, including Exxon, promised
Alaskans that tankers operating in Prince William Sound would have doublebottomed hulls, but broke this promise almost as soon as they received their
operating permits.224 Reinforced hulls could have reduced the volume of the
spill by as much as sixty percent.225 Exxon representatives promised victims
of the spill that if “you show that your motel goes out of business, that we can
take care of. . . . If you can show that you have a loss as a result of this spill,
we will compensate it,”226 but then fought to have all the claims dismissed and
delayed paying the judgment for nearly twenty years.227
Those who vested their hopes in the payment of the jury’s original verdict
must have endured torments similar to those of poor Carstone in Dickens’s
Bleak House.228 In 2007, Exxon (now ExxonMobil) earned $40.6 billion in
shoreline “cooked clams, mussels, and other intertidal animals that had survived the spill and destroyed sea
plants and animals that supported the entire coastal ecosystem”).
222 Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2613 (“In the aftermath of the disaster, Exxon spent around $2.1 billion
in cleanup efforts.”).
223 Some consider Exxon’s cleanup efforts to have been ineffective and mishandled, and claim the
cleanup imposed serious health risks on the cleanup workers. OTT, supra note 14, at 52. Some critics think
that Exxon’s expenditure of $2 billion on cleanup may have been more harmful to Prince William Sound than
doing nothing. SCHOCH, supra note 29, at 44–45. If so, it is a valid question whether the cleanup should have
been considered as a mitigating factor at all.
224 OTT, supra note 14, at 186–87.
225 Keith E. Sealing, Civil Procedure in Substantive Context: The Exxon-Valdez Cases, 47 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 63, 68 n.29 (2003).
226 OTT, supra note 14, at 47 (alteration in original).
227 Id. at 113.
228 See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 936 (Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin Books 1996) (1853)
(“Richard [Carstone], more worn and haggard, haunted the court day after day, listlessly sat there the whole
day long when he knew there was no remote chance of the suit being mentioned, and became one of the stock
sights of the place. I wonder whether any of the gentlemen remembered him as he was when he first went
there.”); OTT, supra note 14, at 272 (“Closure for individuals is a different story. Those who lean heavily on
the Supreme Court’s decision may close this chapter of their lives soon after the court makes a ruling. Those
who wait for the herring to rebound may be waiting years or decades. Those who died—over 6,000—while
their cases churned through the judiciary system will never have had the peace of closure.”).
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profits, breaking its own previous record and once again establishing itself as
the most profitable corporation in history.229 In light of this fact, and
considering the Supreme Court’s reduction of the company’s liability for
punitive damages to roughly one-tenth of the jury’s original $5 billion verdict,
it is not difficult to understand what lies behind the popular impression that the
Court promotes the interests of corporations over individuals.230 In conclusion,
the Court thoroughly undermined its own statement that retribution is a
justification for punitive damages both by its choice of a one-to-one cap and its
treatment of the facts in Exxon Shipping.
V. AN OUTLIER CASE
The Court in Exxon Shipping emphasized that the one-to-one ratio applies
only in maritime cases.231 For punitive damages litigation outside maritime
law, the extent to which Exxon Shipping will prove influential remains an open
question.232 Several courts have already cited the case as persuasive precedent
for limiting punitive damages more than the Supreme Court’s constitutional
punitive damages cases require.233 Since, as this Comment argues, the rule of
Exxon Shipping excessively limits punitive damages, it will be important to
distinguish it in non-maritime punitive damages cases.
Historically, limitations of liability has been an important principle of
maritime law.234 These limits are justified by the inherent risks of shipping,
the need to promote maritime commerce, and the unfairness of holding
shipowners liable for circumstances outside their control.235 According to
Thomas Schoenbaum’s treatise, Admiralty and Maritime Law, “the principle of
limitation of liability remains vital to those involved in the shipping industry
229

Jad Mouawad, Exxon Sets Profit Record: $40.6 Billion Last Year, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at C3.
See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, (Magazine) at MM38 (discussing
the pro-business trend in Supreme Court decisions).
231 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631–32 (2008).
232 As the Court made clear in Exxon Shipping, the case is not binding outside of admiralty. Id. at
2626–27.
233 See, e.g., Leavey v. Unum Provident Corp., 295 F. App’x 255, 259 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“While the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker . . . review[ed] a jury award for conformity
with maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by due process, . . . the Court’s statements in that case
support the district court’s decision to reduce the award here.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 484 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“Although Exxon is
a maritime law case, it is clear that the Supreme Court intends that its holding have a much broader
application.”).
234 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW § 15-1 (4th ed. 2009).
235 Id.
230
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and even to those who seek its services.”236 The Limitation of Shipowners’
Liability Act, enacted by Congress in 1851, remains the binding legal source of
the limited liability principle in U.S. maritime law.237 In British Transport
Commission v. United States, the Supreme Court described the Act as intended
to limit shipowners’ liability to the value of their ships and thus to encourage
maritime commerce and shipbuilding.238 Clearly, maritime law limited
liability long before Exxon Shipping.
Furthermore, before Exxon Shipping, the Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex
Marine239 had the practical effect of limiting punitive damages in maritime
cases.240 Thus, maritime law historically imposed special limits on both
punitive damages and general liability that do not apply to non-maritime.241
While Exxon Shipping makes no explicit reference to the liability-limiting
principles of maritime law (or to the punitive damages implications of Miles),
the history of maritime law reveals that applying the holding of a liabilitylimiting case like Exxon Shipping is simply inappropriate in the context of nonmaritime law. In sum, Exxon Shipping is a maritime case, and its holding
should be strictly confined within the limits of maritime jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court laid out its constitutional punitive damages
jurisprudence in BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore242 and State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.243 These cases addressed
genuine concerns with the punitive damages system and provided reasonable
guidelines for courts to follow when reviewing punitive damages awards.244
The Court’s most recent decision in Exxon Shipping breaks with these earlier
cases in two significant ways: it is not well-reasoned, and the rule it establishes
236

Id.
Id.
238 354 U.S. 129, 133 (1957).
239 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
240 John W. DeGravelles, Uncertain Seas for Maritime Punitive Damages, TRIAL, Jan. 2004, at 50, 51
(“Although Miles did not address punitive damages specifically, it became the launching pad for much of the
case law eliminating them from maritime law.”).
241 Somewhat tautologically, maritime law principles are based on distinctly maritime concerns. See
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 234, § 3-5 (“Thus the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction requires that an incident (1)
occur on navigable waters; (2) bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity; and (3) have a
potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.”).
242 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
243 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
244 See POSNER, supra note 80, at 207.
237
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is inflexible and unsupported by any but the most extreme views of punitive
damages. Because it is a maritime case and because punitive damages promote
fairness and efficiency, Exxon Shipping should neither be cited nor relied upon
in non-maritime cases.
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